Timeline for Security of RSA-3072 with public exponent $2^{16}+1$
Current License: CC BY-SA 4.0
12 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
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| Jun 8, 2021 at 11:05 | comment | added | Evgeni Vaknin | yes, thank you fgrieu for the correction | |
| Jun 8, 2021 at 7:49 | history | edited | DannyNiu |
edited tags
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| Jun 8, 2021 at 6:25 | history | edited | Evgeni Vaknin | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
deleted 157 characters in body
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| Jun 4, 2021 at 20:53 | comment | added | Maarten Bodewes♦ | The value $2^{16} + 1$ is the fifth prime of Fermat or F4 (F0 is the first one). It is used by most software libraries as a sensible default (OpenSSL, Java etc.) | |
| Jun 4, 2021 at 6:03 | history | edited | fgrieu♦ | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
leave -> live
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| Jun 4, 2021 at 2:17 | history | edited | forest | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
use superscript
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| Jun 4, 2021 at 0:26 | history | became hot network question | |||
| Jun 3, 2021 at 21:00 | history | tweeted | twitter.com/StackCrypto/status/1400557927300317191 | ||
| Jun 3, 2021 at 19:20 | comment | added | fgrieu♦ | If there is a modern CPU other than terribly power-constrained, and a millisecond of delay is tolerable, then the RSA signature verification can be entirely in software, which many oppose to hardware even when the software is in ROM, thus "taped out". Verification is hundreds time faster than signature generation, and relatively easy to get right. Hoping to design without prior experience something that does RSA signature generation and remains safe from side-channel attack for 10 years (even with key rotation) is being uh, very optimistic. | |
| Jun 3, 2021 at 18:25 | comment | added | fgrieu♦ | RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 is en encryption scheme. Do you mean RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5? Also, EMSA-PSS is a portion of a signature scheme which full proper name is RSASSA-PSS. | |
| Jun 3, 2021 at 17:57 | answer | added | poncho | timeline score: 8 | |
| Jun 3, 2021 at 16:23 | history | asked | Evgeni Vaknin | CC BY-SA 4.0 |