Timeline for Does impersonating an SRP server give you enough information for an off-line dictionary attack?
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| Jun 17, 2020 at 8:17 | history | edited | CommunityBot |
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| Aug 29, 2013 at 21:52 | vote | accept | Ilmari Karonen | ||
| Aug 10, 2013 at 9:48 | comment | added | CodesInChaos | I'm certainly no expert on SRP and it has been a long time since I looked at SRP so it's quite possible that I'm wrong. Avoiding this attack could be the explanation for SRPs seemingly unnecessary complexity. I always wondered what SRP offers over simple DH. | |
| Aug 10, 2013 at 9:15 | answer | added | Henrick Hellström | timeline score: 2 | |
| Aug 10, 2013 at 6:07 | answer | added | Nick ODell | timeline score: 1 | |
| Aug 9, 2013 at 20:57 | history | tweeted | twitter.com/#!/StackCrypto/status/365939908495425536 | ||
| Aug 9, 2013 at 18:09 | comment | added | Henrick Hellström | As far as I can tell, Wu is right. A server impersonator that just generates a random $B$ would not be able to simulate the operation performed by a legitimate server, because for each guess at $v$, the attacker would have to perform a discrete log on $B-v$ to get the corresponding $b$ value. Conversely, simulating the operation of the client would require guessing the ephemeral private key $a$ as well as the password. | |
| Aug 9, 2013 at 17:45 | comment | added | Ilmari Karonen | Ps. This question is related, but asks about an attack scenario where the attacker knows the verifier $v$, e.g. because they've compromised a legitimate server. My question is about the case where the attacker does not know $v$, but can otherwise impersonate a legit server to the client. | |
| Aug 9, 2013 at 17:39 | history | asked | Ilmari Karonen | CC BY-SA 3.0 |