According to the documentation of HighwayHash, for finding a collision are expected $m \over 2$ guesses, being $m$ the message.

By contrast, 'strong' hashes such as SipHash or HighwayHash require infeasible attacker effort to find a hash collision (an expected $2^{32}$ guesses of $m$ per the birthday paradox) or recover the seed ($2^{63}$ requests). These security claims assume the seed is secret. It is reasonable to suppose $s$ is initially unknown to attackers, e.g. generated on startup or even per connection.

They are talking above about a keyed hash function with input/output of 64-bits, having the key the same size.

But what if a hash a message of 32-bits in size and a 32-bits key, and keep the message and the key secret, does the effort for finding a collision is $m+k \over 2$? $m$ is the message, $k$ is the key?

What would be the formula to calculate the expected numbers of guesses of key + message for finding a collision?

  • $\begingroup$ You are conflating the terms key / key size and message / message size. What's the point of finding a collision under a different key? Are you looking for a key commitment scheme? $\endgroup$
    – Maarten Bodewes
    Mar 19 at 8:36
  • $\begingroup$ @MaartenBodewes Yes, I'm looking for that. If you know how to answer I would appreciate. I'm thinking on a cryptographic scheme in which the point is to have a myriad of collisions to lure an adversary. I would like to know if key+message in hash functions share the same propriety, collisions. Thanks. $\endgroup$
    – alpominth
    Mar 19 at 20:52


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