I started learning about cryptography very recently, and I got interested in the Simplest-OT protocol of Chou and Orlandi. However (as the authors themselves noted) the protocol is not UC-secure against a corrupt sender. My question is: if both sender and receiver are semihonest, is Simplest-OT still not UC-secure?

Thanks in advance.


1 Answer 1


The paper mentions that the issue is with one of the parties delaying an action that makes simulation impossible. So if they are semi-honest and follow the protocol, it should fix that issue. There seems to be other problems with the original proof, but maybe they
don't apply to the semi-honest case.

Here is a rough argument of why it's plausibly UC-secure against semi-honest adversaries in the random oracle model. I leave it to you to fill the gaps.

Extracting the receiver's input

The semi-honest receiver will make a single query to the random oracle as $k_R= H(A^b)$. Let $x$ be the input to $H$ that is observed by the simulator. Since it knows $a$, when it receives $B$ from the receiver, it can guess $c=0$ if $B^a=x=g^{ab}$ and $c=1$ if $B^a\neq x$.

Extracting the sender's input

The semi-honest sender makes exactly two random oracle queries and uses the outputs $k_0,k_1$ to encrypt its two messages. The simulator can record the outputs of these two queries and decrypt both $e_0$ and $e_1$ to recover both messages.

  • $\begingroup$ Simulator doesn't need to extract in the semi-honest model (semi-honest adversaries have inputs provided by the environment). $\endgroup$
    – Mikero
    Apr 4 at 2:22
  • $\begingroup$ Thanks @Mikero, I did not know that. So in semi-honest UC, the simulator only needs to recreate the views of the semi-honest adversary by interacting with its interface of the ideal primitive? $\endgroup$
    – lamontap
    Apr 4 at 15:23

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