Security analysis of using RSA-OAEP and RSA-PSS with the same key

Question

We all know that it is a bad idea to use the same key for multiple purposes. However it sometimes happens that non-cryptography-savvy people will make this mistake - specifically, that they'll use an RSA key both in RSA-OAEP and RSA-PSS. I seem to recall that someone once looked into this, and managed to prove in the random oracle model that nothing terrible happens if you do this. However I'm completely failing to find the paper - does anyone remember what this might be?

Note that an answer to this question consists of a link to an academic paper which performs a formal security analysis of using the same RSA key for both encryption and signing, either finding an attack or using a security reduction to bound the success of such an attack in some attack model. I do not need generic discussion of key reuse.

Answer 1

A paper coming close is: Stuart Haber and Benny Pinkas, Securely combining public-key cryptosystems, in proceedings of CCS 2001. I failed to find a free and legal version online, but the second author's webpage links to a PS file with very similar content. Also I failed to find the full version of the paper, which these mention.

From the abstract:

In this paper we show that in many cases, the simultaneous use of related keys for two cryptosystems, e.g. for a public-key encryption system and for a public-key signature system, does not compromise their security. We demonstrate this for a variety of public-key encryption schemes that are secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks, and for a variety of digital signature schemes that are secure against forgery under chosen-message attacks. (…)
Among public-key signature schemes, we analyze (…) RSA PSS

However they don't mention RSA-OAEP or RSAES-OAEP, only RSA-OAEP+. And I won't even try to state the results.