@fgrieu has written a good answer but there's slightly more to be said on the topic.
It is entirely possible that a paper will someday be published that shows a practical attack on 2048-bit RSA. Equally, a new attack could be discovered that breaks AES in a reasonable amount of time. Finally, someone might find a collision in SHA-256!
This has happened before. When differential and linear cryptanalysis were discovered many designs fell to these attacks. Factoring algorithms have got faster over time, etc etc. A collision was recently found in MD5 and soon after there were tools that could do this in next to no time.
As @fgrieu pointed out, having planned obsolescence gives you opportunity to repair the fence: increase key-size, remove bad algorithms, introduce new algorithms etc etc.
That sad, there are no proofs of (absolute!) security for any of our primitives. Their security is based on the fact that everybody who has looked at these primitives has failed to break them.
Given this, it is difficult to know how long a ciphertext created today with AES-128 will remain secure.
On the one hand, it could well be "forever" and on the other hand a clever grad student somewhere might find a break on AES-128 in $2^{40}$ time tomorrow.
We just don't know.