# Attack of an RSA signature scheme using PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption padding

My best interpretation of this question is that Java's crypto API has been subverted to perform RSA signature using PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption padding.

Assume the signature $S$ of a message $M$ is obtained by:

• hashing $M$ using SHA-1, yielding the 20-byte $H$;
• generating a 105-byte uniformly (true) random $R$;
• forming the 128-byte $P=\text{0x00}||\text{0x02}||R||\text{0x00}||H$;
• forming the 128-byte $S=P^d\bmod N$ where $(N,d)$ is a 1024-bit RSA private key.

I assume that verification of an alleged signature $S$ of alleged message $M$ is as follows:

• rejecting the signature unless $S$ is 128-byte with $S<N$;
• forming the 128-byte $P=S^e\bmod N$ where $(N,e)$ is the 1024-bit RSA publickey;
• hashing $M$ using SHA-1, yielding the 20-byte $H$;
• accepting the signature when the left 2 bytes of $P$ are $\text{0x00}||\text{0x02}$, and the 21th byte from the right of $P$ is $\text{0x00}$, and the right 20 bytes of $P$ are $H$.

Note: conversion from bytestring to number, and vice-versa, is per the big-endian convention.

What attacks are there on this scheme, easier than factoring the public modulus?

• I think it would be more interesting to ask about attacks that are easier than factoring the modulus, $\hspace{.4 in}$ even if they are harder than factoring the private key. $\;$ – user991 Mar 31 '14 at 13:57

There's an easy attack against public keys with $e=3$.
Here's how it works; the attacker selects an arbitrary message $M$ that hashes to an odd value $H$ (or, more generally, a $H$ of the form $k8^n$ for odd $k$). Since half of the potential messages hash this way, this is not a severe limitation to the attacker.
Then, the attacker looks for a perfect cube between $2\times2^{1008}$ and $3\times 2^{1008}$ and whose lower 136 bits are $0x00 || H$, that is, a cube $C$ between $2\cdot 2^{1008}$ and $3\cdot 2^{1008}$ and for which $C \equiv H\ (\bmod\ 2^{168})$. Such a cube is easy to find, just compute $x = \sqrt[3]{H} (\bmod \ 2^{168})$ (with the $H$ of the form we selected, such a value always exists), and then select a value $X$ in the range $\sqrt[3]{2\cdot 2^{1008}}$ to $\sqrt[3]{3\cdot 2^{1008}}$ with $X \equiv x\ (\bmod\ 2^{168})$; $C = X^3$ is such a cube.
The value $X$ is be a valid signature for the message that hashes to $H$; the verifier will compute $X^3 \bmod N$ (which will be precisely $X^3$, and then verify that the first two bytes are $0x00$ $0x02$, and that the right hand bytes are $0x00$ $H$.
This attack can be generalized (for this key size) to $e=5$, and can be extended to handle the case where the verifier also checks to see if there are any zero pads in the random pad.