The reference for this is NIST SP800-38A, especially its appendix B.
Basically we consider the IV a binary value of the width of the block cipher (64-bit for DES, 128-bit for AES), and add 1 to that, except for one detail: there is no carry at some application-specified rank, defining the maximum number of blocks that can be enciphered with a single IV; if that limit is exceeded, we are in trouble (as if we reused a One Time Pad).
A possible setup for AES would be to draw the line at half the 128-bit words size, which "limits" to $2^{64}$ 128-bit blocks. That is $2^{68}$ bytes, or 256 Exbibyte, or 295 Exabyte, or a little over 49 million 6-TB hard disks (the biggest commercially available at time of writing); moving these would require about 1400 double-size (40') containers of 28 tons each.
The other 64 most significant bits can be used as session number. If we draw such session numbers randomly, one each second, for a decade, odds are 1/370 that two session numbers are equal (and we have a small problem there).
It is also perfectly fine to increment over the full 128 bits, and start from a random 128-bit value.
In any practical case: the IVs after $\texttt{69dda8455c7dd4254bf353b773304eec}$ would be $\texttt{69dda8455c7dd4254bf353b773304eed}$ - IF everything is expressed using big-endian convention!
Update: It is also possible to define non-standard ways to increment an IV. One with a low hardware overhead would be cycling a maximal-length LFSR from an initial non-stationary state, which can be implemented with 1 or 3 XOR gates (depending on if the degree allows a trinomial or not) within a single clock delay, rather than some wide adder perhaps with some carry lookahead for high clock rate.