I'm not sure I understand really the implications of proofs of security in the random oracle model. Does a proof of security in ROM translate to a reduction of security of the crypto-system to the security of the hash function in the standard model? If not, then this would imply that the meaning of the ROM proof in the SM depends on the particular algorithm and it would seem almost impossible to say anything general about implications of proofs like this. However, people seem to put a lot of effort in producing proofs of security in ROM so perhaps these proofs do have some value (I just don't exactly understand what, and it would seem extremely hard to point out any general implications). Textbooks tend to be typically quite vague at explaining this.
A very much related question: Does anyone have any insight to whether there is some general reason why proofs of CCA security are expected to be hard (if they even exist) in SM?
By the way, are random oracles really impossible to have in reality? True randomness could be produced by quantum phenomena, so why not use that?