# During electronic voting, how does one hide the choice from Voting device?

Assume the following: I want to cast a vote during an election through an electronic voting system. For our system we make the assumption that the device one uses to cast the vote is potentially compromised and will tell a third party how one votes.

Now we allow any out of band preparations before the election beginns. What methods are there to prevent the device from knowing how the voter chose? One i know of is proposed in the paper "Scratch, click & vote: E2E voting over the internet"

Summary of papers method: To take part in the election the voter gets a coding card and a ballot from two separate authorities. The coding card can be used to determine which fields on the ballot correspond to which candidate. The device the voter uses to vote can only obtain the ballot. as a result the device can not obtain the voters choice as long as none of the authorities collude with the device.

My question is: Are there other Methods to hide the vote from the voting device?

• The hypothesis "none of the authorities collude with the device" is one we'd want to eliminate; we'd want any cheating by colluding authorities to be detectable. $\;$ The voting system where paper ballots, put in opaque envelopes, put in transparent sealed urns, are publicly counted at each voting place, and the results hierarchically added and published, is the best one I know. Paper and plexiglass do not collude with anyone, an observer has good chance to detect a local fraud, and can verify that results s/he verified are properly published and added, and trust other observers do the same. – fgrieu Mar 30 '15 at 17:09
• @fgrieu It's interesting that you take this position. I've had a slapping @ crypto.stackexchange.com/a/61724/23115 for a similar statement. And my view is supported by current UK & Canadian legislation but that doesn't seem to matter. Democracy, eh? – Paul Uszak Aug 30 '18 at 12:02