Stream ciphers and some block cipher modes are particularly vulnerable to having the plaintext modified (rather than just being scrambled) by modifying the ciphertext. With CBC, as in the example you linked to, modifying the IV let's you change a portion of the first block if you know which bytes are which and have some idea of what they contain, and message bytes in other blocks can also be changed.
In several chained block cipher modes, changing the ciphertext will also scramble one or more blocks of the message. With CBC mode, the block preceding the plaintext you're modifying will be completely scrambled (though if you're modifying the first block by changing the IV, no other blocks are modified, since the IV doesn't correspond to any plaintext block). In a stream cipher (and a OTP is just an ideal stream cipher), changing a byte of the ciphertext only affects the one byte of plaintext, making such an attack even easier.
The way to guard against such changes (in both streaming and block modes) is to use a Message Authentication Code. One such MAC, called CBC-MAC, uses the CBC mode of a block cipher (using an IV of zero and only using the final block), and there are other MACs available (e.g. HMAC).
There are a few ways you could use a MAC with a OTP. A MAC needs a key, so you could encrypt the key as part of the message (using the OTP). You would then put the MAC output into the message stream without any additional encryption (no need to waste your precious OTP bits). In that mode you would need to use what's called Encrypt-then-MAC, i.e. do the MAC over the ciphertext, not the plaintext.
A OTP is 100% secure against revealing the plaintext by looking at the ciphertext, but is very vulnerable to attacks that can change the ciphertext. Depending on how the decrypted message is handled, such attacks can even end up revealing plaintext. It's critical that some form of message integrity be used with a OTP or stream cipher, as is the case with any cipher mode that doesn't already have it built-in (e.g. Authenticated Encryption).
Another way of using a block cipher with a OTP would be to encrypt blocks with the block cipher either before or after using the OTP. While that wouldn't add any secrecy (since the OTP already guarantees that), you might think that using it would prevent the type of changes discussed (changing \$100 to \$900, etc). Unfortunately, you'd still want to have some sort of integrity check anyway, so it doesn't gain you anything. In addition, using a mode like CBC doesn't protect against such modifications, using it with a OTP is no better than using it without the OTP.