Are there known constructions which allow to sign a message M (let's say it will be sent as clear text) using a stream cipher C and a symmetric secret key K? So, we have M, C, K and we want to send M|S where S = SIGN(C,K,M) and | is the concatenation operator.
Many caveats: I'm not qualified to write this answer, but hopefully other folks can correct my mistakes. Outside of NaCl's crypto_box and crypto_secretbox constructions, there are a lot of ways to misuse a polynomial MAC. That might be why Thomas Ptacek specifically recommends against them. The standard way to sign a message using a symmetric key is HMAC, and this question seems like kind of an "assuming I'm forced to used a stream cipher instead of a hash for some reason" thought experiment.
Poly1305 is the authenticator in NaCl, and it's built with a stream cipher. First it feeds your message into a big polynomial, to give a checksum. The coefficients of the polynomial are derived from the bytes of your message, and the value of
x in the polynomial comes from half of your secret key. Then it encrypts that checksum, using the other half of your secret key along with a nonce. The cipher for encrypting the checksum can be anything; it was AES in the original paper and it's XSalsa20 in the NaCl implementation. You need the cipher because the checksum by itself can leak the
x that generated it.
One important difference between a polynomial MAC and a hash, is that it's easy to find collisions in the polynomial. If you know
x you can find its multiplicative inverse, and then you can mix that into a message to control the exact checksum you end up with. A polynomial MAC doesn't uniquely determine its input like a good cryptographic hash does.
Another important difference is that the polynomial MAC relies on a unique nonce (for the cipher) to keep its key secret, which means nonce reuse is extra specially terrible.