# Can the backdoor in Dual_EC_DRBG be used to create a public key stream cipher?

Dual_EC_DRBG has the property that if $Q = e\cdot P$, someone who knows $e$ can break the PRNG.

This seems to lead to a public-key stream cipher:

• Alice chooses a random $P, e$, where $P$ is a generator.
• Alice computes $Q = e\cdot P$.
• Alice publishes $(P, Q)$ as her public key. She retains $(P, e)$ as her secret key.

To send a message:

• Bob chooses a random seed $S$.
• Bob publishes the first $n$ bits of the output.
• Bob uses the rest of the output as a keystream.

To decrypt, Alice uses her knowledge of $e$ to break "PRNG" and recover the keystream.

Is this system secure? Does it provide any advantage over other forms of asymmetric cryptography?

• Interesting question, but is there any particular reason why you would want to do this (or are you, like me now, just curious)? Feb 4 '16 at 8:30
• @MaartenBodewes just curious
– Demi
Feb 4 '16 at 15:25

The public key is set up exactly as proposed. Then, to encrypt a message $m$ of any length, do:
1. Choose a random $r\in\mathbb{Z}_q$, where $q$ is the order of the Elliptic curve group
2. Compute $U=r\cdot P$
3. Compute $k = H(r\cdot Q)$
4. Encrypt $m$ with $k$ using any symmetric encryption scheme you wish