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Having a homomorphic encryption scheme like BGV or LTV-FHE at some point it is possible in the homomorphic evaluation to deal with ciphertexts that are encrypted with respect to different moduli.

For the chosen scheme we have a ladder of decreasing moduli $q_0 > ... > q_{t-1}$. If there is a ciphertext $c_1$ w.r.t $R_{q_2}$ and another ciphertext $c_2$ w.r.t to $R_{q_4}$, the first ciphertext should be "switched" into the ring $R_{q_4}$ and only then the homomorphic computation could be done ?

Or maybe this situation should be avoided ? Then, if this is the case, how about computation represented as an unbalanced tree of multiplications? At some point there will be a need to multiply two ciphertexts encrypted in different subrings.

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The problem is that operations between such $c_1$ and $c_2$ are not even defined. You have to reduce the coefficients of the resulting polynomial modulus either $q_2$ or $q_4$, so, you have to switch one of them.

Switch $c_2$ into $R_{q_2}$ would work as well, but since it would increase the noise in $c_2$, it is smarter to switch $c_1$ into $R_{q_4}$ (which gives you meaningful operations and also decrease the $c_1$'s noise).

I think the only way to avoid this switching is to treat both the polynomials as elements of $R$ and check if the coefficients of the resultant polynomials are not greater than $q_4$, because this means that no reduction would be done in the coefficients if operations were done in $R_{q_4}$ and so the resultant polynomial is a valid ciphertext in $R_{q_4}$ and in $R_{q_2}$.

Anyway, the modulus switching operations is not expensive, and it also reduces the noise, so, I don't see advantages in avoiding to do them.

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