In Section 8 of this, Lindell presents a construction of an oblivious transfer protocol which is secure in the malicious model under the following variant of the DDH assumption (page 53):
[F]or every probabilistic-polynomial time non-uniform distinguisher $D$ there exists a negligible function $\mu$ such that $$|\mathrm{Pr}[D(\mathbb{G},q,g_0,g_1,(g_0)^r,(g_1)^r) = 1] - \mathrm{Pr}[D(\mathbb{G},q,g_0,g_1,(g_0)^r,(g_1)^{r+1}) = 1]| \le \mu(n)$$ where $\mathbb{G}$ is a group of [prime] order $q$ with generators $g_0$, $g_1$.
It is then stated that this assumption "follows easily from the standard DDH assumption" using its random self-reducibility property (as described for example by Naor and Reingold).
As I understand it, random self-reducibility means that from any fixed instance we can generate a random one, which can then be solved by an assumed algorithm solving a random instance. Thus no particular instance can be harder than the average case, and so in particular the worst case is exactly as hard as the average case.
However, this does not seem to preclude a particular case from being easier than the average case, and in particular the case $(g^a,g^b,g^{a(b+1)})$, so I fail to see how the hardness of the average case (which is the "standard DDH assumption") implies the hardness of this particular case.