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i have a series of encrypted text , they encrypted by aes 256 bit cbc mode for every encrypted text
there is an iv that i have them also and i know its algorithm is aes 256 bit cbc mode
i can generate new encrypted values that i know what is plain text, but the iv would be different
i have something else named mac that i don't know what it is, it is 64 character in hex format
by the way i know the algorithm is for one of laravel plugins named elocryptfive can i do any attack on it to find key or decrypt values?

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closed as off-topic by fgrieu, e-sushi Feb 5 '18 at 11:30

  • This question does not appear to be about cryptography within the scope defined in the help center.
If this question can be reworded to fit the rules in the help center, please edit the question.

  • $\begingroup$ In a security/encryption context, MAC usually means en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Message_authentication_code . $\endgroup$ – dave_thompson_085 Jun 15 '16 at 9:53
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    $\begingroup$ I'm voting to close this question as off-topic because with the information given, it could only (and unlikely) be answered by diving into the internals of a particular (and not even well defined) piece of software, and finding a gross mistake or backdoor. $\endgroup$ – fgrieu Feb 5 '18 at 11:03
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TL;DR: Chances are there are no attacks against this scheme.

What you are describing sounds exactly like a chosen-plaintext attack, e.g. you can query an oracle to encrypt plaintexts of your choice (using the oracle's random IVs).

Now, this attack is already stopped by AES-CBC which is provably immune to this sort of attack. And furthermore it seems like you can't even mount more advanced attacks which would work against plain AES-CBC as a message authentication code (MAC) seems to be used and judging by your description it's probably HMAC-SHA256 (which gives 256 bit = 32 byte = 64 hex chars output). If these two are put together even somewhat decently (e.g. encrypt-then-MAC), then there's no chance you will learn anything about the key or any plaintexts you didn't query yourself.

That said, the implementation may have flaws (such as being vulnerable to padding attacks or actually not MAC'ing the data but only hashing it), may offer side-channels (because of a bad implementation of AES) or may be otherwise exploitable (standard software exploits circumventing the encryption).

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