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Could cache-timing channels (such as exist for certain block ciphers) somehow be made use of in order to extract memory-access pattern information if both the attacker and user are NOT in a shared compute cluster?

Sub-questions:

  • If not, how can an attacker do so if they both share one physical machine?
  • Is scrypt's memory-hardness exploitable if both the attacker and user are NOT in a shared compute cluster, at all?
  • How many memory address locations are required to be known in order to mount an efficient dictionary attack against that user’s scrypt-hashed password in constant space?
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  • $\begingroup$ Scrypt uses a hash underneath, not a block cipher. $\endgroup$ – Maarten Bodewes Jun 24 '16 at 21:16
  • $\begingroup$ Please do no respond so blatantly. Side-channel attacks can also be applied against one-way functions and cache-timing ones are not an exception for that matter. $\endgroup$ – McJohnson Jun 24 '16 at 21:18

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