No it's not.
As a reminer: Semantic security is equivalent to IND-CPA. Semantic security is less commonly used, because most of the time proofs are less intuitive and more difficult.
In the IND-CPA game, the attacker chooses two messages $m_0,m_1$ and sends them to the challenger. The challenger chooses a bit $b$, and sends $Enc(m_b)$ to the attacker. The attacker wins if he can guess $b$ correctly. And we consider the encryption scheme secure, if the advantage of the attacker compared to random guessing is negligible.
So, let's play the CPA game with this variant:
- The attacker chooses $m_0$ and $m_1$ arbitrary (but not equal)
- He gets back $Enc(m_b)$. In your scheme that would be some value $v$ and $(v+m)^e \mod n$.
- Since he knows both $m_0$ and $m_1$, he can check both possibilities by calculating both $(m_0 + v)^e$ and $(m_1 + v)^e$. Comparing that with the challenge, he immediately knows $b$
- The attacker wins.
If you want to have an IND-CPA RSA variant, there is RSA-OAEP. In the random oracle model and with the RSA assumption, this is proven to be IND-CCA2, which is much stronger than IND-CPA.