What's the purpose of key-rotation?

What's the purpose of key-rotation?

Does it have any effect on the probability of keys being breached in the first place? Does it refer to avoiding access after a breach to all past data, all future data, both or none?

• Uhm, limit damage if keys get breached? Nov 24, 2016 at 21:52
• Does it have any effect on the probability of keys being breached in the first place? Does it refer to avoiding access after a breach to all past data, all future data, both or none? Nov 24, 2016 at 22:02
• Key rotation doesn't decrease the risk of keys being breached. It mainly limits the amount of data encrypted under a certain key, so one may say it's done to so if a future key gets breached past comms are safe(r). Nov 24, 2016 at 23:26
• @SEJPM Some attacks gets easier to perform as the adversary gathers more data protected under the same key. So in some sense the probability of a breach does increase the longer time the key is used. I wouldn't recommend using the same AES key for more than 64GB due to the increasing risk of having two exactly identical cipher blocks. Nov 25, 2016 at 20:29
• @FilipHaglund In all the encryption modes I know of, that would leak some information about the clear text. For example in CBC mode the adversary could compute the XOR of the two plaintext blocks if he had seen two identical cipher blocks. Nov 25, 2016 at 20:56

As @SEJPM notes, the primary purpose of rotating encryption keys is not to decrease the probability of a key being broken, but to reduce the amount of content encrypted with that key so that the amount of material leaked by a single key compromise is less.

However, for signing keys there is a concrete reason: say it takes $X$ months of computation (expected value given your threat model) to crack a key, and you rotate your signing key every $X-1$ months and revoke the old one, then by the time an attacker has cracked the key, any new signatures produced by the attacker will either be A) rejected by clients because of key expiry, or B) back-dated to before the key revocation (which should also raise warning in clients).

• Is this specifically for RSA-like signing schemes? With e.g. hash-based signatures, the best attack method is a simple, stateless brute for search, and since success is a Poisson process, switching keys won't slow down an attacker at all. Jul 14, 2018 at 16:54
• @DanielLubarov I don't follow. Say an attacker starts brute forcing your hash-baned key. Halfway through you rotate keys. You're saying that the attacker does not lose any time? Jul 15, 2018 at 17:07
• I think it depends on the signing scheme. E.g. with Picnic, an attacker would be brute force searching for a single block cipher key. Say the attacker can test all keys in two years. If keys are never rotated, the attack will take two years. If keys are rotated annually, there's a 50% chance of breaking key 1 in the year 1, 50% chance of breaking key 2 in year 2, etc. There's no guaranteed completion date, but the expected time is 2 years. Agree? Jul 16, 2018 at 6:36
• @DanielLubarov Agreed, ... I think, but that's weaker than "switching keys won't slow down an attacker at all", right? Jul 16, 2018 at 11:41
• I guess you're right, but the difference in expected cracking time is up to a factor of two, depending on the rotation frequency. (Again assuming a simple brute force search.) Why not just add one bit to the key size instead of bothering with rotation? Jul 16, 2018 at 20:48

There is no practical reason to rotate keys as a matter of practice, save one, provided the keys you are using are crytographically strong to begin with. This is one of those cases where people assert "best practice" when in fact it's just a practice that has become a standard without any real justification. It MIGHT be appropriate depending on your risk assessment, but it is not a "best practice."

Other than a known breach of the key, the one exception to the general case is when keys are NOT cryptographically strong, or become weak over time, or the algorithm is compromised. In that case, you manually rotate keys (and if necessary algorithms) as soon as you become aware. If you depend on key rotation you will average the rotation interval divided by two of exposure.

I.e., For keys << than 80 bits, like 1DES, and particularly for 8-character passwords which have 47-52 bits of entropy, no frequency of key rotation is sufficient. Say "no" to password rotation and set detective action thresholds--you will save about 1 man hours per person per year in lost productivity, and you gain a real chance of identifying an attack, rather than depending on rotation to limit its extent. And if you can, set minimum password lengths to 16 characters or more.

• "Reducing the volume of compromised material." Theoretically yes, but practically no. If you are rotating keys every year (AWS customer-managed KMS for example), or every three years (AWS managed KMS keys, for example) the majority of your information assets will have been touched during that period in the general case, meaning the person who cracked the key will already have them by the time you rotate. If you have lots of older, extremely valuable data then you might want to rotate, but that is an outlier case, not the general case, and would be reflected in your risk assessment.

• "Rotation of signing keys." I am not aware that signing keys are cryptographically weaker than keys in general. If you accept that passwords should be rotated every 180 days, then a key with 256 bits of entropy can be rotated every 4.6 x 10^63 days. If one wants to argue for setting key rotation to a century or so, just in case, sure -- but short of that it is adding overhead that may bite later (you have to retain the old keys as long as the data they encrypted is valuable, or you have to re-encrypt all your data every time you rotate). For a public CA it MAY (I doubt it) make sense to rotate signing keys "just to be safe," but again this is a matter of risk assessment, not "best practice."

In short, there is no logical or empirical basis for key rotation as a standard or "best practice." It MAY be a good idea depending on an individual organization's risk assessment, but it is by no means a good idea in the general case because of the risks key rotation itself introduces into information governance.

• So what is be the purpose of rotating keys every minute, as done on the encryption devices controlled by quantum key distribution networks? Aug 20, 2019 at 22:35
• @PaulUszak Selling more units by sounding more secure?
– forest
Aug 21, 2019 at 5:51
• I think there is both a logical and an empirical basis for Mike Ounsworth's answer. If I have your subkeys, then I don't want you to change them. Aug 21, 2019 at 10:28
• @PaulUszak Read more, write less: you are referring to a special case. In the general case, the billions of people who use or may use cryptographic keys, regular rotation is neither desirable nor does it mitigate risk. Aug 21, 2019 at 12:36
• @forest My apologies. My argument is with key rotation as a "best practice." It is a practice that may be appropriate, but not by default. If you wish, compare realized losses due to compromised keys versus realized losses due to failures of key management and storage. Aug 21, 2019 at 20:18

Key rotation converges the security of your system to that of perfect information theoretical security. It reduces the size of the data vulnerable to a key breech. Rotating keys on a monthly basis still allows a great deal of information loss under a single key if your network is operating at 10Gb/s (26 quadrillion bits total loss).

But consider the (admittedly) special case of quantum key distribution networks (QKDN). QuintessenceLabs and ID Quantique QKDNs create new keys every few minutes. These systems are approaching the theoretical security of one time pads (OTP). And speeds are ever increasing. Tokyo has demonstrated a OTP based video conferencing system with constant key rotation. And NIST have a CCTV system rotating the same way. These efforts demonstrate the already fast rate of key generation/rotation.

There is a strong trend towards increasing adoption of QKDNs, and we're likely to see more and more data encrypted under single use keys. This constant rotation has the potential to reduce data loss from key compromise to virtually zero as you can't break a OTP.

• Greetings! That first sentence... I see how sentence two can certainly be the case, but I cannot bend sentence one so that it makes sense to me. Perfect information theoretical security applies to the one-time pad. If I rotate a GPG encryption subkey, that is not going to get me to me any nearer to the security level of the one-time pad. Do you mean what you say here, did you misspeak, or am I mistaken? Oct 6, 2019 at 14:38
• For an OTP I would say that the theoretical security is so high because you cannot distinguish between a correct key and a non correct key. However, even if you decrease the amount of data encrypted with a key, you still need preciously few data to validate that a specific key is correct or not. So I don't see this convergence happening at all. Sure, less data is compromised on key loss, but the attack itself doesn't become any less feasible until the key size is about as small as the data size. Hence I cannot agree with this answer. Oct 6, 2019 at 15:01