Imagine the following setting: a party considers a secret sharing or multiparty protocol that is secure against semi-honest adversaries. The adversary selectively chooses the inputs such that it could learn the inputs of its counterparts from what is derived from the output.
A simple example could be taken from any Linear Secret Sharing Scheme Alice secret shares $x$ and Bob $y$ and want to compute $x+y$. Under this scenario, Alice could choose $x=0$, so that she learns Bob's input.
A more complex scenario is what sometimes is described as the full universe attack on Private Set Intersection (the problem of 2 parties computing the intersection of their sets). The attack in this case is as follows: Alice holds a vector $X$ and Bob a vector $Y$, and want to compute the intersection $X ∩ Y$. In this case the attack consists on Alice replacing its set $X$ by a set $X'$ containing all possible inputs on the universe.
From my understanding of what the security definition of MPC is (and the use of an ideal functionality) this attack would be possible under a semi-honest model. My question is the following: Is such attack possible when a malicious adversary is considered? And more importantly, can I consider such adversarial behavior as malicious, or is it indifferent from the MPC security model?
From my understanding of the implications of a malicious adversary and the capabilities of protocols that are secure against malicious adversaries, such as BGW, SPDZ or MASCOT, such an attack would still be possible. However I have recently come across this work on PSI https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/515.pdf, where they classify such attack as a malicious attack, given that the adversary is manipulating its input to learn other parties inputs.