I'm assuming there can't be such schemes because CPA-security is equivalent to CPA-security for multiple encryptions, and an adversary can distinguish between $(\mathsf{Enc}_k(m_0),\mathsf{Enc}_k(m_0))$ and $(\mathsf{Enc}_k(m_0),\mathsf{Enc}_k(m_1))$ if Enc is deterministic, hence there is no deterministic symmetric encryption scheme that is CPA-secure.
However, I can't see how an adversary might distinguish only one encryption from another.
The CPA indistinguishability experiment $\mathsf{PrivK}_{\mathcal A,\Pi}^{\mathsf{cpa}}(n)$:
Let $\Pi = (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ be any encryption scheme, $\mathcal A$ any adversary, and $n$ the security parameter.
- A key $k$ is generated by running $\mathsf{Gen}(1^n)$.
- The adversary $\mathcal A$ is given input $1^n$ and oracle access to $\mathsf{Enc}_k(\cdot)$, and outputs a pair of messages $m_0$, $m_1$ of the same length.
- A uniform bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$ is chosen, and then a ciphertext $c \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}_k(m_b)$ is computed and given to $\mathsf A$.
- The adversary $\mathcal A$ continues to have oracle access to $\mathsf{Enc}_k(\cdot)$, and outputs a bit $b'$.
- The experiment is defined to be $1$ if $b' = b$, and $0$ otherwise.
Definition of CPA-security:
A private-key encryption scheme $\Pi = (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ has indistinguishable encryptions under a chosen-plaintext attack, or is CPA-secure, if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries $\mathcal A$ there is a negligible function $\mathsf{negl}$ such that $$\text{Pr}[\mathsf{PrivK}_{\mathcal A,\Pi}^{\mathsf{cpa}}(n) = 1] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \mathsf{negl}(n),$$ where the probability is taken over the randomness used by $\mathcal A$, as well as the randomness used in the experiment.