RSA in general is often considered to be "discouraged" for new projects. For quite some years, the rallying cry has been "switch to elliptic curves", but nowadays there are calls for going straight for so-called "post-quantum" schemes.
RSA benefits from having survived a lot of public scrutiny (arguably, integer factorization is a problem that has been under studied for three millenia at least), and while there has been substantial progress in cryptanalysis, 2048-bit RSA key are likely to remain secure for a long time. There are also good and bad ways to use RSA for asymmetric encryption, but RSA-OAEP is about as good as you can get with RSA, so that's fine.
Elliptic curves offer better performance (on the decryption side) and are more fashionable. What this means is that before being actually broken, RSA may become disused, meaning that you will get interoperability issues, and implementations will be poorly maintained at some point. In my view, none of this is critical.
Quantum computers eat RSA keys for breakfast; however, they also munge through elliptic curves at lunch time, so that's not a good argument for switching to curves. It's a fortunate thing that quantum computers don't really exist yet (and whether they will exist at some point is an open question). "Post-quantum" schemes are algorithms that appear to resist quantum computers (specifically, these are algorithms for which no efficient quantum-solving attack is known – which does not mean that such attacks don't exist!). There is no real post-quantum drop-in replacement for classic algorithms yet (there are good candidates, but a lot of standardization and implementation deployment is still needed).