CCA-Security Proof of a particular scheme

Suppose to have a scheme that works so: $\mathcal{P}_k =:\{P_k\colon \{0,1\}^{2n} \to \{0,1\}^{2n} \}$ is a strong PRP family.

Encryption: $\operatorname{Enc}(k,m)=P_k(m\mathbin\Vert r)$, where $\Vert$ indicates the concatenation and $r\leftarrow \$ \{0,1\}^n$($r$is random from$\{0,1\}^n$) Decryption:$m\mathbin\Vert r={P^{-1}}_k (c)$, return$m$; I remember that we can define$G^{CCA}_{\pi,\mathcal{A}} (\lambda, b)$as follows: 1)$k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda$2) The adversary$\mathcal{A}$choose two messages$m_0,m_1$. 3)$c_b \leftarrow Enc(k,m_b)$, where$b \leftarrow \$\{0,1\}$. (I denote with $\$$to say that b is random). 4) Adversary must say what message has been decrypted. Let's assume that \mathcal{A} have access to both Enc_k() and Dec_k() (CCA-Security) algorithm. So b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^{\lambda},c_b). 5)\mathcal{A} succeeds if b'=b. We have CCA-security if \mathcal{A} can not do better than guessing, that's for all PPT adversary A$$|Pr[G^{CCA}_{\pi,\mathcal{A}} (\lambda, 1)=1]-Pr[G^{CCA}_{\pi,\mathcal{A}} (\lambda, 0)=1]| \leq \upsilon(\lambda) \in negl(\lambda)$$How can I proceed by reduction? Can someone give me an help? • You might want to define what$r\$ is, even if I guess it might just be a fixed length random value. – Lery Nov 7 '17 at 14:49
• Can you say anything about what you have tried so far? The security notions are standard, but can you provide definitions of them, and relate them to where you're stuck? – Squeamish Ossifrage Nov 7 '17 at 15:31