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If we have an array of ciphertexts based on the same data encrypted with different keys (e.g. sharing the data with different persons using different 128 bit keys), then is it easier to an attacker to guess the data without knowing any of the keys? If so, then is there a way to harden this kind of encryption? (To be more specific the data is a 128 bit group key encrypted with the personal key of each person.)


marked as duplicate by Maarten Bodewes, e-sushi Nov 30 '17 at 15:11

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migrated from security.stackexchange.com Nov 30 '17 at 12:16

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  • $\begingroup$ Yes, brute force. When the keys change, you have almost nothing to leverage, leaving you basically with just one ciphertext which is exactly what AES is built for and (currently) secure. $\endgroup$ – Tobi Nary Nov 30 '17 at 12:23
  • $\begingroup$ Thanks for the dupe link, it was migrated, that's why I did not find it on the other site. $\endgroup$ – inf3rno Nov 30 '17 at 20:30

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