# Using round constants to thwart slide attacks

I'm partly unclear as to how the use of round constants in an iterated cipher makes it immune to slide attacks. I mean, I can see how it does from one perspective, but if the solution to slide attacks is by "making each round different", then shouldn't distinct round keys accomplish this, too?

AES-128 uses 11 round keys, without the round constants, all the rounds of the AES key-schedule will be same. Thus there is chance that there exist two master keys $Ka$ and $Kb$, such that there corresponding round keys differ at only one place.
Suppose 11 Round keys for $Ka$ are: $ka,k1,k2,k3,k4.......k9,k10$ and 11 Round keys for $Kb$ are: $kb,k1,k2,k3,k4.......k9,k10$
if you set $Kb=k1$, then 11 Rounds for kb will be: $k1,k2,k3,k4,k5....k10,k11$