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Consider the following challenge-response protocol for $A$ to convince $B$ that he is indeed $A$. Here we are assuming:

  • at the start when the virtual circuit is being set up, $A$ has to convince $B$ that he is indeed $A$.
  • once a virtual circuit has been set up, the BG cannot alter messages in the middle.
  • $A$ and $B$ share a secret value $S$.

$B$ sends $A$ a nonce $N$.

$A$ calculates $C$ to be the first 64 bits of $N$ XORed with the first 64 bits of $S$.

$A$ returns $C$ back to $B$.

$B$ checks whether $C$ = first 64 bits of $N$ XORed with the first 64 bits of $S$.

If it is, $B$ accepts that $A$ is indeed $A$. is it good idea to use this kind of functionality?

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  • $\begingroup$ I edited your question to improve the formatting - please review it to ensure that I did not accidentally modify the meaning of your question. $\endgroup$
    – Ella Rose
    Feb 4, 2018 at 0:48

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Since N xor C reveals the first 64 bits of S, the secret cannot be reused. Also, a MITM attacker can observe the message sent from A to B then drop it. Then the protocol cannot restart with a new nonce. If you prefer a challenge-response protocol, maybe just use S to hash the nonce and send the result to the other party.

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