The Kuwakado-Morii attack (the attack of Kaplan et al. is a nice adaptation of this) relies crucially on Simon's algorithm, which essentially says that on the group $(\mathbb{Z}/2)^n$, the hidden shift problem is easy. That is, from quantum access to $H(\cdot)$ and $H(\cdot\oplus s)$, it is possible to recover $s$ efficiently.
On the other hand, the Key-wrap algorithm of NIST SP 800-38F does not use group structure. Well, at least not much: while some constants are XORed during the execution of the algorithm, no adversarially-controllable data are ever XORed during the computation: the whole process is mostly built using shuffling and blockcipher evaluation.
Of course, we cannot really know whether it would be secure until we prove the security, but some constructions not relying on group structures (not even XOR) are known to be quantum-secure: for example, Zhandry proved that the GGM construction is a secure PRF, and, it happens that GGM uses only function composition, not group structure.
At the least, I think this suggests that Kuwakado-Morii is not really applicable here.