Within the modern concept of cryptographic security of symmetric cipher, resistance to key-recovery under CCA and CPA is a must, because for most of modern encrypted communication, plaintext is almost always partially guessable alongside ciphertext.
Here, CCA and CPA are two general attack models (I'm simplifying):
In both model, the attacker will try to establish correlation between ciphertext and plaintext to aid further decryption, and one of the methods as you've mentioned - is to simply guess the key.
Modern symmetric ciphers and their mode of operations, such as AES-GCM (RFC 5116 and Official NIST webpage), AES-CBC-HMAC, ChaCha20-Poly1305, are secure enough for your purpose. And in addition, they provides authenticity - communicating parties can be sure the ciphertext didn't come from attacker or anybody else.
Side note, there are mature protocols for encapsulating application communication - such as SSL/TLS - which requires a x509 certificate (which you need to buy), or SSH (secure shell) - which uses a "known_hosts" file to authenticate the server. They've also mature implementations such as LibreSSL and OpenSSH that you can use.