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I am trying to implement a distributed encryption system by having as a main source of information this book (Introduction to Cryptography by Delfs and Knebl) and this Internet article (More Mix than Net by Wood).

I generate the following variables:

  • $p$: prime,
  • $g$: generator,
  • $x$: random within $[1, p-1]$,
  • $h$: $g^x \bmod p$

I can then use these variables to successfully encrypt, re-encrypt, and decrypt a message.

I am now trying to make the system use multiple authorities by following subsection 4.5.5 on Delfs's book that states:

enter image description here

According to this subsection $x$ is computed as a random number between $1$ and $q-1$, yet I am using the range $1$ and $p-1$ as shown in the article. Another difference is that in the book there is no mention of modulo $p$ when computing $h$.

Note that I have also implemented the ElGamal system as described in the book, but I would like to go with the implementation from the article since it makes more sense to me and I would like to not use external libraries).

My question is, what is the commitment I should generate and how can I later verify it?

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    $\begingroup$ طاهر الجمل himself spells it Elgamal according to Wikipedia, but I - and it seems most others - prefer ElGamal so that it becomes two connected words. "el gamal" however not really acceptable for names, some capitalization is in order. $\endgroup$ – Maarten Bodewes May 11 '18 at 12:56
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You can use a hash based commitment scheme, which is very simple to implement. The downside is that it is not easy to do zero-knowledge proof with the commitments. But from what you have given in the question, this does not seem to be a problem.

Let $\lambda$ be the security parameter (e.g. 128), let $H$ be a cryptographic hash function:

1 To commit, generate a $\lambda$-bit uniformly random string $r$. Then compute the commitment $C(h_i)=H(h_i||r)$.

2 To open a commitment $c=C(h_i)$, reveal $(h_i,r)$ and others can verify and accept if $c=H(h_i||r)$.

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I can't access the book, so not sure exactly what it says, but the article you referenced also seems to be generating values in a group with order q: my intuition is that they are just using separate variables and group is of the same size in both texts just using $q$ and $p$ as variables respectively. As long as you are sampling $x_i$ uniformly from the full modular group you should be okay.

A for using modulo p, the security of El Gamal relies on the hardness of discrete log within the group $G$ with order $p$, so all operations are bounded via $\bmod p$.

Hope this is helpful, did I understand your question correctly?

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  • $\begingroup$ The part of the book I am referencing is about creating a mixnet where we use the Shamir secret sharing technique to distribute the public keys. Since I created a simple system that can encrypt and de-crypt data using the ElGamal encryption scheme I would like to advance it a little bit and create a number of authorities that implement the distributed ElGamal scheme. I am confused about the generation of the commitments though. $\endgroup$ – dearn44 May 11 '18 at 18:25

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