What are the minimal components to build a security model proof for a protocol?

This question might seem trivial, but having read many papers-- from the IEEE, ACM, etc., that talk about a KMP-- I still don't know where to start. For example, should I use the adversary model or a random oracle?

  • 2
    $\begingroup$ IMHO it depends on the context. Defining a protocol you need to set a context, what is the protocol used for, what is its goal. Then you could define environment (primitives and assumptions) and threats. (TLS has different goal, environment and threats than SAML). $\endgroup$ – gusto2 Jul 31 '18 at 8:08
  • 1
    $\begingroup$ Although I am sometimes wondering if the choice is correct for crypto.SE or for most sites on the SE network, asking for resources is an explicit reason to vote a question off topic. Maybe you could change the question to make it on topic again, e.g. asking what are the minimal components of a security proof. $\endgroup$ – Maarten Bodewes Aug 1 '18 at 14:30
  • $\begingroup$ Dear Marteen, thank you very much for your suggestion. I modified my question. $\endgroup$ – CipherX Aug 1 '18 at 14:34
  • $\begingroup$ You may want to note that usually the ROM comes in through the proof and not the model / security definition itself. $\endgroup$ – SEJPM Jul 16 '19 at 12:14
  • $\begingroup$ To clarify (because you mentioned the ROM): You are asking how to (systematically) construct a security definition for a protocol, right? $\endgroup$ – SEJPM Jul 16 '19 at 12:14

Your Answer

By clicking “Post Your Answer”, you agree to our terms of service, privacy policy and cookie policy

Browse other questions tagged or ask your own question.