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Possible Duplicate:
Why is H(k||x) not a secure MAC construction?

I've the following problem: two parties, A and B, share a secret key Kab. M is a plaintext message, H an unkeyed hash function

A send to B M, H( Kab | M ) (where | means concatenation).

If we want to provide data origin authentication and data integrity (no confidentiality required) my exercise states that we have to change the protocol to this:

A send to B M, H( Kab | M | Kab ).

I don't understand the difference in term of guarantees of the two protocols and thereby, why the second one is 'right' and the first one is not?

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marked as duplicate by CodesInChaos, mikeazo Jan 28 '13 at 19:18

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    $\begingroup$ See: crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/1070/… $\endgroup$ – mikeazo Jan 28 '13 at 16:03
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    $\begingroup$ Note that the exercise assumes that the hash in question is a Merkle-Damgaard hash without truncation; if the hash was (say) SHA-3 or SHA-2-384, $H( Kab | M)$ does appear to be sufficient. $\endgroup$ – poncho Jan 28 '13 at 16:35
  • $\begingroup$ Thank you. I supposed that the problem was with 'non-ideal' hash function. Now it's clear to me, thanks! $\endgroup$ – ArtoAle Jan 28 '13 at 16:55

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