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Is there any way to hash from a string $\in \{0,1\}^{*}$ into a supersingular elliptic curve $E(F_p)$ such that the hash function behaves(provably) like a random oracle, and is efficient?

Using Maurer's indifferentiability framework 1, one can prove that a cryptosystem using a random oracle is secure if the random oracle is replaced by an "indifferentiable" hash function. Brier et. al. 2 prove the conditions for a hash function to be indifferentiable from a random oracle, i.e. to put it simply, the hash function has to use an "admissable encoding" of elliptic curve points. They also provide a construction based on Icart's function that appears to work only on ordinary elliptic curves.

My question is, does there exist similar such constructions for supersingular elliptic curves? The Boneh-Franklin IBE requires the use of a hash function to a supersingular elliptic curve. They construct a hash function and prove that their IBE scheme is secure using the new construction. However, they do not prove that this construction is "indifferentiable" from a random oracle, or that this construction can be used in any other cryptographic scheme without altering its security.

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Elligator works just fine for any (including supersingular) elliptic curve with a point of order $2$, with the sole exception of $j=1728$. The latter special case can also be done; see Section 4.2 here.

(The requirement that the curve has a point of order $2$ is trivially fulfilled for supersingular $E/\mathbb F_p$ where $p>3$ is prime, since this implies $\#E(\mathbb F_p)=p+1$ which is always even.)

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