Sure, you can use Grover's algorithm to attack AES-128 in CTR mode. Assume the attacker knows a few plaintext blocks and the counter. The AES ciphertext blocks that are generated by encrypting this counter and XOR'ing it with the plaintext. In that case the input and output of the AES-128 block cipher are known and Grover's attack can be applied (as if AES-ECB was used).
Similarly SHA-256 in HMAC mode could well fall for Grover's attack. But Grover's attack only halves the security of the symmetric algorithms. That means that for SHA-256 you would still be left with 128 bits of security for most situations.
However, SHA-512 is actually faster on 64 bit architectures than SHA-256, so it seems a good idea to use that if you can spare the space (and otherwise SHA-512/256 exists as well). Note that later Intel and AMD CPUs may contain Intel SHA-1 and SHA-256 instructions that offer hardware accelleration. So the performance of SHA-256 is much higher, easily beating SHA-512, if those instructions are utilized.
So yes, AES-128 could fall to Grover's attack and although HMAC-SHA256 is considered pretty secure, it does make sense to at least design your protocol in such a way that future updates to the protocol are a possibility. Although there is no pressing need to change from AES-128 or HMAC-SHA256, in general you want your algorithms to be configurable for different versions of the protocol.
The only reason to switch now is to make sure that captured sessions cannot be decrypted in the future. In that case you may also have to look at the way the session keys are calculated. Asymmetric algorithms, for instance, are much more vulnerable to QC crypt-analysis. So if you're dealing with that level of confidentiality you should switch to AES-256 as soon as possible.