My Question is based on poncho's answer in this post.
If you're doing a meet-in-the-middle attack against 2DES with only on a plaintext-ciphertext pair $(P,C)$, I understand that the expected amount of remaining key candidates is $2^{48}$, assuming that DES encryption/decryption yields a random 64-bit block if done with a wrong key.
What makes me curious now is: if you have another plaintext-ciphertext pair $(P',C')$ to validate the candidates, what is the probability that a wrong key still remains?
So my approach is the following: We just start a new attack, with the reduced key set. Since there are only $2^{48}$ keys left, the possibility of a specific block is $\frac{2^{48}}{2^{64}}$ which is $2^{-16}$. Is this is already the possibility I'm looking for? If yes, then this leads me to the conclusion that despite the probability of one specific block is very small, there are still $2^{48} * 2^{-16} = 2^{32}$ candidates in the set!