# Is the simulation-based proof difficult and needed? [closed]

What is the role for simulation-based proof under the semi-honest model without considering malicious adversaries? I agree with that a view of a some party is important to prove that a protocol is secure under some assumption which is semi-honest or malicious setting. I'm wondering if a proof of simulation-based for a protocol makes sense. I see some papers providing proofs using simulation-based technique under semi-honest adversary. But I don't think it is needed since its semi-honest. Most of cryptographers take care of the information leakage.

In other words, I think a simulation-based proof under the semi-honest adversary is not reliable. Often it's trivial while a proof for malicious adversary is NOT trivial. Moreover, when non-experts read that paper, the proof makes paper difficult to read.

So, is the simulation-based proof under semi-honest model really needed in the literature?

## closed as off-topic by fkraiem, e-sushiOct 24 '18 at 22:32

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