I know that the same message $m$ was sent to two people resulting in ciphertexts $c_1, c_2$. The public keys are $n_1$ and $n_2$, $gcd(n_1, n_2) = 1$. And $e=3$ in both cases. How can I retrieve the original message without brute-forcing it?

I.e. the exponent $e$ is the same in both public keys, but the modulus $n$ is different: $n_1, n_2$.

  • $\begingroup$ My question is different: e is the same, n is different $\endgroup$ – SlowerPhoton Oct 30 '18 at 17:35
  • $\begingroup$ CRT based attack requires 3 ciphertexts for $e=3$ See the comment at Low Public Exponent Attack for RSA $\endgroup$ – kelalaka Oct 30 '18 at 18:08

The problem seems like a variant of Håstad's broadcast attack, except that is usually stated with $e$ ciphertexts, when here there is $2<e$ ciphertexts.

We know $m^e$ modulo $n_1$ and modulo $n_2$ (that's the givens $c_1$ and $c_2$), thus we can compute $m^e\bmod(n_1\,n_2)=y$ using the Chinese Remainder Theorem, per $y\gets(n_2^{-1}(c_1-c_2)\bmod n_1)\,n_2+c_2$

If we are lucky enough that $m<\left\lfloor\sqrt[e]{n_1\,n_2}\right\rfloor$ (roughly, $m$ of bit size less than $1/e$ of the sum of the bit sizes of the moduli), then $y$ will be exactly the $e^\text{th}$ power of some integer $x$, we can get that $x$, and it will be $m$.

If not, we can try, for incremental $i$, if any of the $y_i=i\,c_1\,c_2+y$ is exactly an $e^\text{th}$ power; that slightly extends the attack.

Note: none of this is RSA as correctly practiced. What's raised to the power $e$ modulo $n$ should not be the message, but a randomly padded message (per e.g. RSAES-OAEP) computed separately for each ciphertext sent, and almost as wide as the public modulus.

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  • $\begingroup$ in this question's answer Deciphering the RSA encrypted message from three different public keys says that you need $e$ ciphertext. $\endgroup$ – kelalaka Oct 30 '18 at 18:47
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    $\begingroup$ @kelalaka: we need $e=3$ ciphertext for the attack to succeed for any $m$, and that's how the standard Håstad's broadcast attack is usually stated. This is a variant, and it will succeed only if $m$ is small enough. $\endgroup$ – fgrieu Oct 30 '18 at 19:25
  • $\begingroup$ I'm fine with your solution. if $e=5$ then 5 $c$'s? $\endgroup$ – kelalaka Oct 30 '18 at 19:28
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    $\begingroup$ @kelalaka: yes the standard Håstad's broadcast attack works for 5 $c_i$ when $e=5$, whatever $m$. It could work for less $c_i$ for small enough $m$, namely for $m<\left\lfloor\sqrt[e]{\displaystyle\prod n_i}\right\rfloor$ (or slightly above that thresold with some extra guesswork) $\endgroup$ – fgrieu Oct 30 '18 at 20:03

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