Thanks for all the answers. I realize that I had a big mistake. I did not figure out the distribution of the pseudo-random sequences.
I try to use PRGs or PRFs to define the pseudo-random sequences. If there is a formal one, please tell me.
Of course, the pseudo-random sequence and the truly random sequence are indistinguishable. And the definition should describe some possible collections of "pseudo-random sequences" (e.g. M-sequence). I also consider that what the "sequence" is. Is it a kind of "numbers" or "functions"?
As a book "Lecture Notes on Cryptography" written by Shafi Goldwasser and Mihir Bellare says,
The one-time pad is generally impractical because of the large amount of key that must be stored. In practice, one prefers to store only a short random key, from which a long pad can be produced with a suitable cryptographic operator. Such an operator, which can take a short random sequence $x$ and deterministically “expand” it into a pseudo-random sequence $y$, is called a pseudo-random sequence generator. Usually $x$ is called the seed for the generator. The sequence $y$ is called “pseudo-random” rather than random since not all sequences $y$ are possible outputs; the number of possible $y$’s is at most the number of possible seeds. Nonetheless, the intent is that for all practical purposes $y$ should be indistinguishable from a truly random sequence of the same length.
It is important to note that the use of pseudo-random sequence generator reduces but does not eliminate the need for a natural source of random bits; the pseudo-random sequence generator is a “randomness expander”, but it must be given a truly random seed to begin with.
To achieve a satisfactory level of cryptographic security when used in a one-time pad scheme, the output of the pseudo-random sequence generator must have the property that an adversary who has seen a portion of the generator’s output $y$ must remain unable to efficiently predict other unseen bits of $y$. For example, note that an adversary who knows the ciphertext $C$ can guess a portion of $y$ by correctly guessing the corresponding portion of the message $M$, such as a standardized closing “Sincerely yours,”. We would not like him thereby to be able to efficiently read other portions of $M$, which he could do if he could efficiently predict other bits of $y$. Most importantly, the adversary should not be able to efficiently infer the seed $x$ from the knowledge of some bits of $y$.
It seems that the notion of pseudo-random sequences is an approach to find a way to generate the pseudo-random number. Although I think the pseudo-random sequences have more functions perhaps. Thus, I think it is correct to use the definition of PRGs to define the pseudo-random sequences.
Let $G \colon \{\, 0,1 \,\}^{*} \rightarrow \{\, 0,1 \,\}^{\infty}$ be a generator of sequences if for all the polynomial $p(\cdot)$, $G_{p}$ is polynomial-time, where $G_{p}(s)$ is the first $p(|s|)$ bits of $G(s)$. We say $G$ is a pseudo-random-sequence generator if there exists a negligible function $\varepsilon(\cdot)$ such that for every polynomial $p(\cdot)$ and every PPT distinguisher $D$,
$$\left\vert \Pr\left[ x \leftarrow \{\, 0,1 \,\}^{p(n)}: D(x) = 1\right] - \Pr \left[
s \leftarrow \{\, 0,1 \,\}^{n}: D(G_{p}(s)) = 1 \right] \right\vert \leq \varepsilon(n)$$
there are some kinds of classical pseudo-random generators: linear feedback shift registers and the binary expansion of any algebraic number (such as $\sqrt{5}= 10.001111000110111 \ldots $). Although they are both insecure. It shows that the sequence does not need a finite period.
I still do not know how to define it by using the definition of PRFs. Because I cannot find a function like $f_{s} \colon \{\, 0,1 \,\}^{\lambda(|s|)} \rightarrow \{\, 0,1 \,\}^{\lambda(|s|)}$ where $s$ is the key.