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Is it possible that you can still have a collision resistance in Merkle-Damgard even if the compression function has a collision?

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Yes, a hash built per the Merkle-Damgård construction can be collision-resistant even if its compression function has a known collision.

Consider SHA-256. Note its round function $F:\{0,1\}^{256}\times\{0,1\}^{512}\to\{0,1\}^{256}$ where the first argument is the state and the second is a message block. Now define $F'$ identical to $F$, except that $F'(0^{256},0^{512})$ is defined to be $F(0^{256},1^{512})$.

$F'$ has a known collision, yet the variant of SHA-256 using $F'$ is collision resistant, because we can't find a way to bring the state of SHA-256 to all-zero, which would essentially be a preimage attack.

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For a very realistic example, see the analysis contained in Black-Box Analysis of the Block-Cipher-Based Hash-Function Constructions from PGV by Black, Rogaway, and Shrimpton.

They explore all the ways of building a Merkle-Damgaard hash function with an ideal cipher as the underlying compression function, finally classifying which are secure and which are not.

Interestingly, they find a category of constructions with the property you mention:

... group-2 schemes ... are collision resistant even though their compression functions are not.

As an example, their $H_{13}$ uses $f(h_i, m_i) = E_{h_i \oplus m_i}(m_i)$ as the compression function. Although this round function leads to a secure MD hash function, by itself it is not even one-way. To find a preimage of $y$, first choose arbitrary $k$, then compute $m : = E^{-1}_k(y)$ and $h := m \oplus k$. Then $(h,m)$ is a preimage of $y$.

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