Homomorphic/Paillier crypto system for use case?: overflow for multiple counter exponent possible? Different cipher factor needed all the time?

Question

Recently I read about homomorphic cryptosystem. They might solve a problem. To do this there need to be some modifications from standard version.

Using Paillier here but a solution for other also fine.

E.g. given two cipher text $c_1,c_2$ with generator $g$ and factors $r_i$:
$c_i = g^{m_i} r_i^n \mod n^2$
$n=p\cdot q$, with $p,q$ primes

Now if they get multiplied
$c_1 \cdot c_2 \equiv g^{m_1} r_1^n \cdot g^{m_2} r_2^n = g^{m_1+m_2} (r_1r_2)^n \equiv g^{m_1+m_2} r^n \mod n$
The factors $m_1, m_2$ get added. If they get $n$ or larger they start over again. In normal use case that is prohibit by selecting a larger $n$.

Now I'm looking for a way to get this overflow for a special kind of $m$. Image an election with 3 candidates and their votes counted in one exponent.
E.g. candidate 1 has 5 votes, 2 has 6 and 3rd 42 votes, exponent of $g$ could be ${005006042}$. In another region it's ${133700123}$. If ciphers multiplied those exponents get added and sum up all votes for each single candidate. This exponent form only allows up to $999$ total votes for each candidate (assuming the total exponent number is $<n$).

In my use case there will always be some exponent overflow, no matter how big $n$ is. But instead the whole exponent it should be one for each candidate.
E.g. $700.800.900$ and $400.100.200$ should add up to $100.900.100$ instead of $1100.901.100$.
Is there a way to have multiple overflows in exponent? Or an alternative way for multiple counters?

Elements also get subtracted, so there need to be an underflow as well.

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As far as I understood each cipher can(should?) have its own $r$. For my use case it need to be associative in some way. It need to be the same cipher independent of order and direction. E.g. adding 5 votes to a cipher should result in same ciphertext as adding 5 times one vote to the same cipher. That should work if there is only one $r$ (for each candidate)(+$r^{-1}$ for subtraction). But a single $r$ works against security, or?
You know another way to achieve this? Some way to check if two different $c_1\not= c_2$ have the same exponent without encrypting it would also work.

Answer 1

It won't work anyways because even in case it would be secure with one $r$ and the exponent can get overflow for each candidate the ciphertext with same exponent will be different after an overflow happened.

Do you really mean deterministic (that is, one particular m always maps to the same c)

Given two ciphertext with same exponent ($\mod n$) before and after overflow. The 2nd would be result after adding $n$ times one vote to first.
$c_0 = g^0 \cdot r^n \mod n^2$
$c_{i+1} = c_i \cdot c_{add+1} = c_i \cdot g^1 \cdot r^n = g^i \cdot r^{in+n}$
$c_a=g^a \cdot r^{an+n} \not=g^{a+n} \cdot r^{an+n^2+n}=c_{a+n}$ $\mod n^2$
(because $r^{\phi(n^2)}=1$ and $n^2 \not = \phi(n^2)$ )
Decryption resolve in same $a$ but exponent of $r$ is different and with this those two ciphertexts.