# What does “simulatable” mean in security proofs?

I am reading a security proof in a paper as follows.

Regarding the data confidentiality of users, all related public transcripts are simply the ciphertexts $$\mathcal{C}_1,\ldots,\mathcal{C}_n$$. The ciphertexts are easily simulatable according to the semantic security of the public key encryption. How can I interpret this proof? In other words, what is meant by simulatable?

That means you can produce a transcript by yourself (with only public knowledge), which has a sequence of values $$C_1',\ldots,C_n'$$ such that the distribution of $$C_1',\ldots,C_n'$$ and that of $$C_1,\ldots,C_n$$ are computationally (since public key encryption) indistinguishable.