Perfect forward secrecy usually involves a ratchet so it's helpful to visualize it as such.
Strictly for PFS, without state compromise recovery, you do not require an asymmetric cryptographic scheme at all. Solely symmetric suffices.
The way it works is that you have a state (reached either through a pre-shared key or an asymmetric key exchange) which yields (it can be part or even the full state but for security hygiene an additional hash is usually used - it also allows you to keep some past keys cached for asynchronous communications risking only what those keys encrypt and not the state) a symmetric key used for encryption and communication. The state is then ratcheted forward usually using a hash function - the previous state becomes impossible to reach after it's destroyed.
Compromise of the state allows compromise of encryption up until the state has last been ratcheted, going past that point is not possible if the implementation is correct and the relevant information was properly destroyed. Note that after such a compromise the adversary can ratchet along with you and compromise all future communications. PFS protects the past not the future.
If you add to this an asymmetric ratchet as well (good instant messaging protocols do this) whereby in addition to ratcheting the symmetric state you also mix in a new state from an ephemeral key exchange, then a compromise (assuming it does not endure) will only compromise the information between the last symmetric ratcheting and the next asymmetric ratcheting.