Well, I guess that I have always been a little bit suspicious ... so to speak ... of the "official stories" about the difficulty of recovering Enigma message texts during WW2, because it seems to me that they're always focused on recovering "one message, in isolation." Whereas, the actual situation faced by the intercept stations is that they were every day flooded with messages ... all of them encrypted using exactly the same (of course, unknown) network-key settings, differing only by their per-message keys.
So – my question is: "did all of that 'daily network-key mumbo-jumbo' actually matter," if you could be assured of a sufficient number of messages each day which ultimately differed from one another only by a three- or four-letter wheel setting?
I could go on at some length, but I think the question is clear: could not cryptanalysts have exploited the process of statistically comparing the gathered messages against each other, treating most of the machine as simply "a pair-swapping transposition table that didn't change?"