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I am given the following problem.

Consider SHA-256 to be a random oracle in a practical application. Construct an (almost) random oracle $\{0,1\}^*→\{0,1\}^{3000}$ based on SHA-256.

Does it mean that the input is any length of zeros and ones and that is should hash to a value which is 3000 digits of zeros and ones? If yes, could I just apply SHA-256 12 times, splitting the input in 12 parts and remove 72 bits, then I will get 3000 bits? Or did I misunderstand?

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  • $\begingroup$ Is this a part of a HW? $\endgroup$
    – kelalaka
    Commented Apr 21, 2020 at 20:20
  • $\begingroup$ @kelalaka The problem is part of a course but it is not homework for any student to hand in. The problem is an exercise and part of a course in cryptography if that counts as "homework" but I don't think so... Because HW/homework is something that a student should hand in right? $\endgroup$ Commented Apr 21, 2020 at 20:39
  • $\begingroup$ Interestingly it seems a homework somewhere but the site doesn't provide the update time. $\endgroup$
    – kelalaka
    Commented Apr 21, 2020 at 20:44
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    $\begingroup$ @kelalaka My problem set from the course appears to be publicly available and it is exactly the same three exercises but my problem number is 6 instead of 10 which is on the page from your link. $\endgroup$ Commented Apr 21, 2020 at 20:49

1 Answer 1

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Does it mean that the input is any length of zeros and ones and that is should hash to a value which is 3000 digits of zeros and ones?

Yes, that's the meaning of $\{0,1\}^*→\{0,1\}^{3000}$. It would be better to reformulate using the usual shortcut for "digits of zeros and ones": bits. Also, $\{0,1\}^*$ is the set of all bitstrings.

Could I just apply SHA-256 12 times, splitting the input in 12 parts and remove 72 bits, then I will get 3000 bits?

$256\times12-72=3000$, thus you have the domains right. But would that be indistinguishable from a random oracle¹? No. Find how you would make the distinction. Then improve that construction. Ideally, make a proof that if a method could distinguish the refined construction from a random oracle¹, then it could be turned into a method making that distinction for SHA-256.

A random oracle with $k$-bit output is an hypothetical device that accepts a bitstring as input, and

  • if that bitstring was not previously submitted, draws and outputs a random bitstring in $\{0,1\}^k$
  • otherwise outputs the same bitstring as it did for the previous submission of the input bitstring.

¹ With no way to compute SHA-256, and perhaps disregarding the length-extension property of SHA-256, and its input length limitation; some or all of these might be what the question means with "(almost)".

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