Preliminary: the present answer assumes an Elliptic Curve group of order $n$ built on a prime field of order $p$, with one of $p$ or $n$ a 160-bit prime of the form in the question (rather $p$, which will give the most computational benefit, and is close to common practice). Choosing "public key $P$ as $p*G$ where $p$ is an Optimal prime" is not proper, and not considered.
Rather yes: ECC cryptography would be dangerously close to being vulnerable to brute force attack.
That's because the order $n$ of the Elliptic Curve group would be at most roughly $2^{160}$ (due to Hasse's bound when the 160-bit prime is $p$), thus vulnerable to a generic Pollard's rho attack with cost about $2^{160/2}=2^{80}$ field operations, e.g. recovering a private key from a public key. Further, that attack is not too difficult to parallelize. That's not entirely out of reach for well funded adversaries.
However, the largest similar attack publicly performed (by Nov. 2020) seems to be against secp112r1, requiring about $2^{56}$ field operations, that is about $2^{25}$ less work than for the above. See Joppe W. Bos, Marcelo E. Kaihara, Thorsten Kleinjung, Arjen K. Lenstra, and Peter L. Montgomery's Solving a 112-bit Prime Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem on Game Consoles using Sloppy Reduction, in International Journal of Applied Cryptography, 2012.
Thus for a 160-bit prime, a similar attack would be worth publication in the applied cryptography field. And in the unlikely cases that it it required sizably less than $2^{80}$ field operations, or less than $2^{25}$ more computing power than the secp112r1 attack on any given sufficiently flexible hardware, that would be a major theoretical breakthrough.
Update per comment: I fixed the above to use proper notation for $p$ and $n$. Yes proper ECC on a 160-bit prime field is not publicly broken in practice so far. Yes a 256-bit OPF $p$ would be on par with current practice: common curves such as secp256k1 and Ed25519 use primes of the form $2^{256}-2^{32}-977$ or $2^{255}-19$, which is similar to the question's OPF. Beware however that what matters to security is (half) the number of bits of the highest prime factor of $n$ (that is $n$ if it is prime), which depends on $p$ and other curve parameters. And there are other complex considerations in choosing an ECC curve, that I do not master, see safecurves.