The answer is definitely yes. You should be able to do what you are looking for. The computation is very simplistic, so using existing MPC protocols will be efficient. Many of the existing protocols are able to evaluate a few blocks of AES using MPC per second, so this computation will be no problem.
Typically MPC works by translating your function into a circuit (either boolean or arithmetic). In the 2 party case, you are probably best off using Yao's approach. There are newer constructions that you could use and that would probably still be efficient, but they do use some heavy public key crypto and I'm not aware of any publicly available implementations. For Yao's approach, I'd recommend the MightBeEvil framework. I believe Yao's approach is most commonly (if not always) used with boolean circuits. Another option is Fairplay.
In the multi-party case (more than 2 parties), garbled circuits won't do (at least not with publicly available implementations). Your options here are really Viff and Fairplay-MP. Viff uses arithmetic circuit representations while Fairplay-MP uses boolean circuits. Viff has a specialized protocol from Toft for comparison to help mitigate some of the problems with comparison in arithmetic circuits (more on this in a moment).
Adversary Model
You don't mention adversary model in your post, but I thought I'd say a little on this. You have 3 choices in the literature: semi-honest (or honest-but-curious), covert, and malicious (or Byzantine). Fairplay, Fairplay-MP, and MightBeEvil all only support semi-honest adversaries while Viff has support for both. Theoretically any of Fairplay, Fairplay-MP and MightBeEvil could be made to support malicious adversaries, but they don't out of the box and would require significant work (not to mention publishing to make sure you didn't make any mistakes).
If you are not familiar with the difference, semi-honest assumes that corrupt parties will follow the protocol as specified and only use information gleaned during the execution to violate privacy. Malicious makes none of these assumptions (parties can deviate all they want from the protocol and will always be caught, caught with overwhelming probability). I am not aware of any implementations available publicly that support covert adversaries. FYI, a covert adversary is one who will deviate but doesn't want to be caught, so you only have to define the protocol such that the probability of catching a deviating adversary is high (as opposed to overwhelming).
Boolean vs Arithmetic
Both approaches have their strengths and weaknesses. In arithmetic circuits, addition is cheap but comparison is much more expensive. The opposite is true in boolean circuits. I believe that, for example, in the MightBeEvil framework, they have built in circuits for say a 32 bit adder but not a 2000 bit adder. Thus, input size will make a difference here. On the arithmetic side, you only have to define the underlying field large enough to support the input size. This will have an effect on performance, but not as large as in the boolean circuit approach.
Comparison in boolean circuits is relatively easy. Simply start with most significant bits and compare the bits using a single bit comparison operation. Scan from MSb to LSb, stopping when a difference is found. Whoever has the 1 bit in this case is the larger of the two. On the arithmetic side, things are more complicated which is why Viff uses a specialized protocol from Toft. For small input sizes, it probably won't make a huge difference.