This question Can Elgamal be made additively homomorphic and how could it be used for E-voting?
says ElGamal can be made homomorphic over multiplication. So you can have $(g^r, h^r g^m)$ (i.e., encrypting $g^m$) vice $(g^r, h^r m)$.
Then in this question Difference between Pedersen commitment and commitment based on ElGamal they point out that the Pedersen commitment looks a whole lot like the second item in the tuple.
So of course I wonder:
- Is there a version of Pedersen where you just commit to a base, and will it be unconditionally hiding? I.e. is $P = u h^r$ a hiding commitment for the value $u$?
- I know that taking a variation on Schnorr's protocol, you can prove you know the opening of a commitment $g^mh^r$. If the answer to the first question is yes, is there a variation where you can prove you know $u, r$ from commitment $P$? I think the answer is yes, if you just do the appropriate shift from exponentiation to multiplication to addition but I don't know if there is any security issue which would crop up as a result.
- Finally, what groups would this work for/does the security assumption remain the same? I believe regular Pedersen just requires discrete log to be hard (so I was thinking $\mathbb{Z}^*_p$ for the generator where $p$ is a prime). Would that still work?