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Given a Merkle-Damgård hash function $H$, I know that an attacker can forge a message protected by a MAC computed as $H(\textrm{secret_key}||\textrm{message})$.

Why can't he perform the same extension attack on a MAC construction $H(\textrm{message}||\textrm{secret_key})$?

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How does the length extension attack against $H(k||m)$ work?

For Merkle-Damgård hashes, if you know $H(x)$ but not $x$ you can still choose an $e$ and then compute $H(x||p||e)$. With $x=k||m$ you can compute $H((k||m||p)||e)=H(k||(m||p||e))$ which is a valid authentication tag for $m||p||e$.

Why doesn't it work against $H(m||k)$?

With a length extension an attacker chooses the extension. The only non trivial way to make $H(m||k||e)$ a valid tag is if $e$ ends with $k$. Since the attacker doesn't know the secret key they can't put the key at the end of $e$ and thus can't produce a valid tag.

What should I be using?

Either use H(k||m) with a hash that's not vulnerable to length extension attacks, such SHA3. Or use HMAC with an older hashfunction, such as SHA2. $H(m||k)$ is not ideal because it can be attacked by finding collisions of $H$. Collisions are one of the easier attacks crypto-analytically and require a hashfunction twice the width of the target security level. e.g. SHA-256 for a 128 bit security level.

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