Security of Paillier against chosen ciphertext attack

Is there a proof by now that Paillier is secure against chosen-ciphertext attack? The original Paillier paper mentions that it is not.

If we have a ciphertext $$C$$ and an Oracle that will decrypt any ciphertext (other than $$C$$), what an attacker can do to decrypt $$C$$ is generate the encryption of $$0$$ (which is presumably not the ciphertext value $$1$$), and homomorphically add that to $$C$$, generating the ciphertext $$C'$$, and hand $$C'$$ to the decryption oracle. As long as the encryption of $$0$$ is not $$1$$, then $$C \ne C'$$, and so the decryption oracle will have us the plaintext corresponding to $$C'$$, which will be exactly the same value as the plaintext of $$C$$ - the attacker wins.