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If I encrypt a file with a short 4 digit pin is there any way to make it more secure. I've thought about hashing the 4 digit pin and using the result as the encryption key. I think this would work as long as the attacker didn't know that I was using this strategy but if they did they could just try the 10^4 hashing of the possible pins.

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  • $\begingroup$ Is it easy to crack a hashed phone number? $\endgroup$
    – kelalaka
    Apr 8, 2021 at 20:04
  • $\begingroup$ I. Believe this is possible by embedding the 4digit pin in an alpha string. Eg aefgyreju1234jhfds and sha the string twice. Here is another example: 76530964CraigWrightIsSatoshiNakamoto87643 $\endgroup$
    – Tom Kelly TAK
    Sep 24, 2021 at 16:15

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The hash idea isn't great. See Kerckhoffs's principle. The underlying secret is still the four digit PIN, which is only $4 \times -\log_2(10) = 13$ bits of security. And don't we all pick '1234' anyway?

You can use a key derivation function like Argon2 (there are others). That slows down hackers attempts at guessing your PIN. You could aim for something like one second on typical hardware. Still it could be brute forced after a mean time of an hour and a quarter on that same kit though.

Security could be further enhanced with an $n$ tries and you're locked out policy if there is a server involved with conditional logic. This would be implemented by also using the derived encryption key to encrypt a series of four check digits, say all zero. If they do not decrypt to all zero, it's the wrong PIN, so try again until lock out. This is how your ATM card behaves.

And a further further method would be to have an increasing/exponential delay between attempts. This would depend on your customers' acceptance though.

A longer pin is an option if the business allows it. Windows login PINs are six digits.

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Fundamentally, there isn't, because there's way too few combinations. You can however look into some practical measures some systems use to mitigate weak PINs or passwords like these.

One technique is to combine the PIN or weak passwords with a strong secret key that the user however is not required to memorize or manage. Perhaps most famous example is how Apple iOS devices bake a 256-bit secret key into their CPU's secure enclave and derive the master encryption key from the phone PIN and that secret key. This means that an attacker who just clones the phone's disk isn't able to decrypt it off the device. As this Security Stack Exchange answer puts it:

At the core of the system, there is a device-specific key called the UID-key; it is stored in the CPU itself and each CPU has its own. From that key are derived other keys, including the one used for KeyChain; the user's passcode is also used in the key derivation. The CPU is assumed to be tamper-resistant, which means that you should not be able to extract the UID-key from it. If you access the hardware directly, you can make the CPU use the UID-key, but any brute force attack on the passcode will need to go through the actual CPU.

In addition to this the devices guard against PIN-guessing by slowing down after repeated failed guesses. But even with these protections, Apple several years ago stopped allowing 4-digit PINs and now requires a minimum of 6 digits.

Second example: the 1Password password manager mitigates against weak master passwords by creating a strong Secret Key for each user and, instead of demanding that the user memorize it (which is impractical), asking them to print out an "Emergency Kit" that contains a textual copy of the secret key and store it in a physically secure location:

Your Secret Key is 34 letters and numbers, separated by dashes. It’s stored on devices you’ve used to sign in to your account, and in your Emergency Kit. Only you have access to it. Your Secret Key works with your Master Password – which only you know – to encrypt your data and keep it safe.

Note that since the user is not required to memorize the Secret Key, the devices must store a copy of it that the password manager must be able to read with no more protection than the password itself. This is OK because the point of the Secret Key is to protect cloud backups of the password vault:

These differences in entropy and memorability allow your Master Password and Secret Key to protect you from different kinds of threats:

  • Your Master Password protects your data on your devices. Someone who has access to your devices or backups won’t be able to unlock 1Password without your Master Password, which only you know.
  • Your Secret Key protects your data off your devices. Someone who attempts a brute-force attack on our servers won’t be able to decrypt your data without your Secret Key, which we never have.

But, to stress this point again, these examples don't make 4-digit PINs or weak passwords fundamentally safe. They're just roadblocks thrown in the way of some of the attack scenarios. 4-digit PINs are fundamentally easy to guess by brute force.

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My educated-guess is no. Hashing could help only if original pin has low entropy, e.g. because maybe you digit with your thumb on a mobile phone and reaching some number on keyboard is easier than others... but brute-force success rate (that we could consider a lower bound to attacker's success rate) will never be lower than 1/(10^4)... so if you mean "more secure" than that, I think it's impossibile

EDIT: of course only if hash is unknown to attacker, otherwise no improvement

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