Does blinding protect again fault injection attack against RSA with CRT

I know that blinding can be used as a countermeasure against side-channel timing attacks on RSA-CRT: RSA Timing Attack and Prevention through blinding

My question is: can blinding also be used as a countermeasure against differential fault injection attacks on RSA with CRT as described by BellCoRe (see: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00939473/document and here: https://www.limited-entropy.com/crypto-series-dfa/)

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• "The exact nature of the fault does not matter," provided that it's in (exactly) one of the modular exponentiation $y_p\gets x^{d_p}\bmod p$ or $y_q\gets x^{d_q}\bmod q$, rather than in the preparation of $x$ or the final $y\gets((y_p-y_q)\,q_\text{inv}\bmod p)\,q+y_q$. That does not change the answer's conclusion, even if the blinding was tweaking the moduli $p$ and $q$ (e.g. computing the exponentiations modulo $r\,p$ and $s\,q$ for some small random $r$ and $s$ ), as long as there is no self-check in the blinding. – fgrieu May 5 at 15:24